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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 18 months, several monumental changes have occurred
not only within the general property tax landscape in Louisiana, but
specifically to the valuation of oil and gas properties, including a new
constitutional amendment adopted by the voters in November 2020
allowing an additional valuation methodology to be used for those
properties. 1 Additionally, the Louisiana Legislature recently passed
legislation which substantially amended the statutory provisions for the
administration, review, and appeal of ad valorem tax assessments. 2 This
Article is intended to alert the reader to the impact of those changes on
taxpayers challenging property tax assessments, as well as update the
reader on recent case law and pending cases in the oil and gas arena. To
set the stage and assist the reader with property tax terminology, this
Article begins with a primer providing a general overview of property tax
constitutional and statutory principles, the basics of Louisiana property tax
administration, determining fair market value, and challenging property
tax assessments. 3
II. PRINCIPLES FOR PROPERTY TAXATION IN LOUISIANA
The Louisiana Constitution empowers local and state governments to
impose an ad valorem4 tax on real and personal property, 5 generally
referred to as a “property tax.” 6 The State of Louisiana, however, does not
exercise its power to impose a property tax. Ad valorem taxes on property
in Louisiana are imposed only at the parish level.
1. See Act No. 368, 2020 La. Acts, amending article VII, section 4(B) of the
Louisiana Constitution and approved by the voters in November 2020.
2. See Act No. 343, 2021 La. Acts, filed as House Bill 573 for the 2021
Regular Session.
3. The Article is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the complete
property tax system in Louisiana, but it is intended to focus on the criteria most
related to the valuation of oil and gas properties.
4. The Latin term ad valorem means "according to value." All ad valorem
taxes are levied based on the determined value of the item being taxed. Real
property taxes are the most common type of ad valorem taxes, and in Louisiana,
ad valorem taxes can also be imposed upon personal property. See Ad Valorem
Tax, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ad_valorem_tax (last
visited Apr. 25, 2022).
5. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2322 (2021); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 115
(2021) (defining of "real property"); id. § 117 (defining of “personal property”).
6. See LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 18–19.
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The constitutional principles that are the foundation of the property
taxation powers are clarified in the Louisiana Revised Statutes. 7 These
statutes are further implemented by rules and regulations promulgated by
the Louisiana Tax Commission (“LTC”). 8 The LTC is a five-member body
appointed by the Governor to supervise the parish tax assessors and
oversee property valuation and assessment throughout the state. 9 The LTC
is the entity empowered to “administer and enforce all laws related to state
supervision of local property tax assessments.” 10 The LTC’s purpose and
mission are as follows: (i) to achieve fair, accurate, and uniform ad
valorem taxation through effective oversight of assessors; (ii) professional
and unbiased administration of tax laws; (iii) to serve Louisiana taxpayers
fairly and with integrity by administering property tax laws; (iv) to provide
the general public with a centralized place to obtain property tax
information; and (v) to provide confidence to the taxpayers in the state that
their assessments are fair and equitable. 11
Property subject to ad valorem taxation must be listed on the parish
assessment rolls at its assessed valuation, 12 which is a percentage of its
fair market value (“FMV”). 13 In the most common application of ad
valorem taxes, the taxable property is annually assessed by the parish tax
assessor to determine its current value. 14 The assessed value 15 of the
property is used to compute a tax annually levied on the property. The

7. See LA. REV. STAT. tit. 47, subtit. III. The Revised Statutes provide
additional standards and principles concerning the methods and procedures for
taxing property. The LTC must promulgate and adopt all rules and regulations
pertaining to property taxation according to the Louisiana Administrative
Procedure Act (LA. REV. STAT. §§ 49:951–49:968). These statutes outline the
procedures for publicizing and ultimately enacting or changing the rules and
regulations pertaining to the taxation of property. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61,
pt. 5, § 107.
8. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5.
9. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 47:1831–47:1838.
10. Metrailer v. Granger, 552 So. 2d 720, 722 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting
LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1837(A)).
11. LA. TAX COMM'N, www.latax.state.la.us (last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
12. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(A); LA. REV. STAT 47:1951.
13. Williams v. Opportunity Homes Ltd. P’ship, 240 So. 3d 161, 163 (La.
2018) (citing LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(A)); see also LA. REV. STAT. §
47:1951(B).
14. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18; LA. REV. STAT. §§ 47:1951–47:1952,
47:1957.
15. See LA. REV. STAT. 47:1957(B); see also Metrailer, 552 So. 2d at 722.
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assessment is derived from the application of the appropriate percentage
to the fair market value. 16
The basis for any property tax assessment is the determination of fair
market value. 17 In Louisiana law, fair market value has only one definition
for all property. 18 “Fair market value” is defined as “the price for property
which would be agreed upon between a willing and informed buyer and a
willing and informed seller under the usual and ordinary circumstances.” 19
FMV represents the highest price the property will bring if placed for sale
on the open market, with reasonable time allowed to find a purchaser with
knowledge of all the legal uses and purposes to which the property is best
adapted. 20 The percentage of FMV must be uniform throughout the state
upon the same class of property. 21 Uniformity requires that each property
be assessed at the same percentage of market value.22 Without uniformity,
there is no property tax equity. Property subject to ad valorem taxation is
divided into five classifications and assessed at certain percentages of
FMV as follows: 23
Classifications
Percentages
a. Land
10%
b. Improvements for Residential Purposes
10%
Electric Cooperative Properties, excluding
c. Land
15%
d. Public Service Properties, excluding Land
25%
e. Other Property (including Personal Property)
15%
Most oil and gas properties, commercial improvements, and general
business assets are classified as “other property” and are therefore assessed
at 15% of FMV. 24 Certain interstate natural gas pipelines are considered
16. See LA. REV. STAT. 47:1957(B); see also Metrailer, 552 So. 2d at 722.
17. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18; LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1957(B).
18. See LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2321.
19. Id.; see also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 109, 301 (2021) (defining
fair market value).
20. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2321; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 109, 301.
21. Williams v. Opportunity Homes Ltd. P’ship, 240 So. 3d 161, 163 (La.
2018) (citing LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(A); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §
101(A)).
22. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18.
23. Id. § 18(B); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 101(B).
24. See Jones v. S. Nat. Gas Co., 63 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (La. Ct. App. 2011);
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 304(B).
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“public service properties” 25 and are therefore assessed at 25% of FMV. 26
The LTC has promulgated rules and regulations specific to ascertaining
the FMV of oil and gas properties, 27 drilling rigs and related equipment, 28
and pipelines. 29
The term “property” includes every form, character, and kind of
property—real, personal, and mixed; tangible and intangible; corporeal
and incorporeal; and every share, right, title, or interest in such property. 30
Both real property 31 and personal property 32 are subject to ad valorem
taxation in Louisiana. Most oil and gas properties—such as well surface
equipment, subsurface equipment, and pipelines—are considered
“personal property” for ad valorem reporting and assessment purposes. 33
Real property is reappraised every four years in accordance with the
uniform valuation date and quadrennial reappraisal cycle as determined by
the LTC, 34 and personal property is reappraised every year. 35 The next
reappraisal year for real property is 2024, and all real property is to be
valued as of January 1, 2023. 36
In general, assessments are based on the condition of things existing
as of January 1 of each year. 37 For all parishes, other than Orleans,
assessments are made based on the condition of things existing as of
January 1 for that same year’s property taxes, and the property taxes for
that year are due by December 31. 38 However in Orleans Parish, new
improvements and exemptions are based on the condition of things
existing on August 1 of each year for the following year’s property taxes. 39
Orleans Parish taxes are paid in advance instead of arrears, as is the case
in all other parishes. 40

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 47:1851–47:1858.
Jones, 63 So. 3d 1083; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 304(B).
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 901–907.
Id. §§ 1101–1103.
Id. §§ 1301–1307.
See LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1702; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 114.
LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2322; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 115.
See LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2322; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 117.
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 304(B), 307.
LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(F); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 121.
LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(F); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 121.
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 303(D).
See LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1952(A).
See id. § 47:2127(A).
See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 113, 303(B).
See LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2127.
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III. ADMINISTRATION OF AD VALOREM TAXES
Louisiana ad valorem taxes are administered at the parish level by the
Parish tax assessor’s office. 41 The office of tax assessor is an elected
position, and each parish assessor is elected to serve for a four-year term. 42
The parish tax assessor is responsible, under the supervision of the
LTC, for listing and assessing all property within his/her respective
parish. 43 Tax assessors are mandated by statute to “enumerate and list and
assess property.” 44 The assessment rolls are prepared from the assessment
lists. 45 An “assessment roll” is a written record of taxable persons and
property in a taxing jurisdiction, which are prepared by tax assessors and
available for public inspection at a certain time each year. In Louisiana,
the public inspection period is a 15-day period between August 15 and
September 15 of each year, depending on the parish. 46 The LTC must
approve the assessment rolls. 47
Each assessor is required to gather all data necessary to properly
determine FMV of all property subject to taxation within his respective
parish. 48 In securing this data, the assessor may employ the use of selfreporting forms to be used by property owners. 49 The assessor may choose
to use the self-reporting forms for real property; however, the personal
property forms must be forwarded by the assessor to the taxpayer on or
before February 15 of each year. 50 Each person is required to fill out a list
of its property and affirm its accuracy under oath on the blank forms
provided by the assessor prescribed for the listing and assessing of
property. 51 Such forms and the rules and regulations necessary for their
administration are applicable throughout the state and must be applied
41. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1957(A).
42. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 24.
43. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1957(A). The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently
reaffirmed that the LTC is the “supervisory state agency over parish tax
assessors.” Williams v. Opportunity Homes Ltd. P’ship, 240 So. 3d 161, 165 n.3
(La. 2018).
44. Metrailer v. Granger, 552 So. 2d 720, 721 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting
LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1903).
45. See LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1993(A); See also id. §§ 47: 1956, 47:1957,
47:1987, 47:1992 (the statutes for generally listing and assessing property).
46. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1992(F) (providing an exception, however, for
Orleans Parish which is for a period of 32 calendar days).
47. Metrailer, 552 So. 2d at 722 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1993(C)).
48. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2324.
49. Id.; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 118 (2021).
50. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2324; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 307.
51. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2324; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 307.
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uniformly on similar types of property. 52 The reporting forms are due April
1 of each year or within 45 days after receipt, whichever is later. 53 The
assessor may grant an extension of time for filing. 54
Specific forms, referred to as “LAT” forms, 55 have been developed for
the annual reporting by taxpayers of property, including oil and gas wells,
drilling rigs and related equipment, and pipeline properties.56 The LAT 5
Form is used to report general business assets such as inventories,
merchandise, furniture and fixtures, machinery and equipment, leasehold
improvements, and miscellaneous property. 57 The LAT 5A Form is used
to report tax-exempt properties. 58
The penalties for failure to timely file the reporting form or failing to
make an oath to its correctness include waiver of rights to appeal the
assessment (specifically, no legal right or cause to question or contest the
determination of FMV by the assessor) and may include a monetary
penalty. 59
The LAT reporting forms filed by a taxpayer are confidential and are
used by the assessor, the governing authority, the Louisiana Tax
Commission, and the Louisiana Department of Revenue, for the sole
purpose of administering the ad valorem statutory provisions and
verifying eligibility for the inventory tax credits claimed under Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 47:6006. 60 The completed forms submitted to the
tax assessor are confidential and are not subject to public disclosure
provided, however, such forms are admissible in evidence and subject to
discovery in judicial or administrative proceedings according to general
evidentiary law relating to the production and discovery of evidence. 61
52. See LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2326; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §
119(A)(1).
53. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2324; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 118(A),
307(A).
54. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2324.
55. “LAT” – Louisiana Ad Valorem Taxation.
56. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 307(A)(8), 903–905 (LAT-12 and
LAT-5); id. §§ 307(A)(9), 1101 (LAT-13 and LAT-5); id. §§ 307(A)(10), 1301–
1303 (LAT-14).
57. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 307(A)(1), 905, 1101.
58. Id. § 307(A)(2).
59. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 47:1992, 47:2329–47:2330; see also LA. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 118(B), 307(B)(2).
60. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2327.
61. Id.; see also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 119(A)(2) (“Forms filed by
a taxpayer with an assessor to assist in his determination of fair market value are
confidential.”).

426

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. X

IV. DETERMINING FAIR MARKET VALUE
Each assessor is required by article VII, section 18(D) of the Louisiana
Constitution to “determine the fair market value of all property subject to
taxation within his respective parish or district except public service
properties,” which are valued at fair market value by the LTC. 62 Public
service properties are centrally assessed by the LTC, not the local parish
tax assessor. 63
The criteria for determining FMV must be uniformly applied
throughout the state. 64 To implement the criteria for determining FMV, the
LTC is responsible for adopting uniform guidelines, procedures, and rules
and regulations pursuant to the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act
(“LAPA”). 65 Each assessor must follow those uniform criteria in
determining FMV of all property subject to taxation within his/her parish,
and any manual or manuals used by an assessor are subject to approval by
the LTC. 66
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal discussed the interrelated
duties and powers of the Office of Tax Assessor vis-a-vis those of the LTC
in the Metrailer v. Granger case. 67 In that case, the court emphasized that
assessors “shall be responsible, under the supervision of the Tax
Commission, for listing and assessing all property” within their respective
parishes. 68 The court further stated: “The assessor is to make a valuation
pursuant to uniform criteria, and the Tax Commission is empowered to
adopt ‘guidelines, procedures and rules and regulations’ to implement
such criteria.” 69
The FMV of real and personal property is determined by using the
following generally recognized appraisal procedures: the market
approach, the cost approach, and the income approach. 70 “In utilizing the
market approach, an assessor is required to ‘use an appraisal technique in
62. Williams v. Opportunity Homes Ltd. P’ship, 240 So. 3d 161, 164 (La.
2018).
63. Gisclair v. La. Tax Comm’n, 16 So. 3d 1132, 1136 (La. 2009) (citing LA.
CONST. art. VII, § 18(D); LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1854).
64. See Williams, 240 So. 3d at 164 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2323(A)).
65. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 49:951–49:968.
66. See Williams, 240 So. 3d at 164 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2323(A)–
(B)); see also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 111(A)–(B).
67. See Metrailer v. Granger, 552 So. 2d 720 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
68. Id. at 721 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1957(A)).
69. Id. at 722 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2323(A)).
70. See Williams, 240 So. 3d at 164 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2323(C));
see also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 111(C)), 303(A).
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which the market value estimate is predicated upon prices paid in actual
market transactions and current listings.’” 71 “In utilizing the cost
approach, an assessor is required to ‘use a method in which the value of a
property is derived by estimating the replacement or reproduction cost of
the improvements, deducting therefrom the estimated depreciation; and
then adding the market value of the land, if any.’” 72 “In utilizing the
income approach, an assessor is required to ‘use an appraisal technique in
which the anticipated net income is capitalized to indicate the capital
amount of the investment which produces the net income.’” 73
The LTC rules require that in the analysis of fair market value of oil
and gas properties, economic and functional obsolescence must be
considered “as substantiated by the taxpayer in writing.” 74 That same
language is also found in the LTC rules for valuing drilling rigs and
pipelines. 75 Obsolescence is defined as “a decrease in the value of a
property occasioned solely by shifts in demand from properties of this type
to other types of property and/or to personal services.” 76 The principal
causes of obsolescence are listed as: (1) changes in the esthetic arts; (2)
changes in the industrial arts, such as new inventions and new processes;
(3) legislative enactments; (4) change in consumer demand; and (5)
migration of markets. 77 Economic (external) obsolescence is the loss of
appraisal value resulting from causes outside the property. 78 Functional
obsolescence is the loss in value due to lack of utility or desirability of a
portion or all of the property. 79
The taxpayer bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence to the
assessor and the LTC to substantiate a request for obsolescence.80 Case
law in connection with this taxpayer burden is discussed more fully below.
71. Williams, 240 So. 3d at 164 (emphasis added) (quoting LA. REV. STAT. §
47:2323(C)(1)).
72. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2323(C)(2)).
73. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2323(C)(3)).
74. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 907(A). This Article discusses in more
detail the taxpayer’s burden of substantiating a request for obsolescence.
75. See id. §§ 1103, 1305.
76. Id. § 301.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also Regency Intrastate Gas, LLC v. La. Tax Comm’n, 329 So.
3d 838, 846 (La. Ct. App. 2021), writ denied, 331 So. 3d 320 (La. 2022) (stating
that the LTC defined economic obsolescence as a “diminution in value or
usefulness from economic factors, such as decreased demand or changed
governmental regulations.”).
79. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 301.
80. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Pitre, 468 So. 2d 747 (La. Ct. App. 1985);
Bailey v. Enervest Operating Co., 43 So. 3d 1046 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
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V. NEW CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT FOR VALUING OIL AND GAS
WELLS
The oil and gas industry—through the Louisiana Oil and Gas
Association (“LOGA”) and Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas
Association (“LMOGA”)—and the Louisiana Assessors’ Association
worked together to propose an amendment to article VII, section 4(B) of
the Louisiana Constitution during the 2020 Regular Session allowing a
more accurate approach to be used for the valuation of oil and gas
properties. 81 The legislation passed both the House and Senate
unanimously. 82 The proposed constitutional amendment was subsequently
approved by Louisiana voters in November 2020. 83
The methodology for valuing oil and gas properties for ad valorem tax
purposes has been an issue for decades. As mentioned above, there are
three approaches to valuation—the cost approach, the income approach,
and the market approach. 84 Due to the limitations of the language in article
VII, section 4(B) on imposing any tax other than a severance tax on oil,
gas, or sulphur leases or rights, the assessors had historically been forced
to use the cost approach, and sometimes the market approach if the data
was available, to value oil and gas properties. 85 Leaders in the oil and gas
industry and the assessors both agree that the income approach may offer
a better alternative to valuing oil and gas properties. The income approach,
by definition, allows the assessors to consider the potential revenue stream
from the production of minerals as part of the formula for valuing the
properties. 86 Leaders in the industry expect that this shift in valuation
methodology, if used by the assessors, will result in a more fair and
accurate determination of fair market value for oil and gas properties.
The amended language to the constitutional provision pursuant to Act
368 is underlined below. Note that the language is not mandatory but is
permissive. An assessor is not required to use the income approach to
determine FMV of oil and gas properties but may do so.

81. Act No. 368, 2020 La. Acts.
82. See 2020 Regular Session: HB360 by Representative Mike Huval, LA.
STATE LEGIS., https://legis.la.gov/Legis/BillInfo.aspx?s=20RS&b=HB360&sbi=y
(last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
83. See id.
84. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2323(C) (2021).
85. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(B).
86. See LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2323(C)(1).
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§4. Income Tax; Severance Tax; Political Subdivisions 12
Section 4. 13
***
(B) Severance Tax. (1) Taxes may be levied on natural resources
severed from the soil or water, to be paid proportionately by the
owners thereof at the time of severance. Natural resources may be
classified for the purpose of taxation. Such taxes may be
predicated upon either the quantity or value of the products at the
time and place of severance. No further or additional tax or license
shall be levied or imposed upon oil, gas, or sulphur leases or
rights. No additional value shall be added to the assessment of
land by reason of the presence of oil, gas, or sulphur therein or
their production therefrom. However, sulphur in place shall be
assessed for ad valorem taxation to the person, firm, or
corporation having the right to mine or produce the same in the
parish where located, at no more than twice the total assessed
value of the physical property subject to taxation, excluding the
assessed value of sulphur above ground, as is used in sulphur
operations in such parish. Likewise, the severance tax shall be the
only tax on timber; however, standing timber shall be liable
equally with the land on which it stands for ad valorem taxes
levied on the land.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subparagraph (1) of this
Paragraph, the presence of oil or gas or the production thereof,
may be included in the methodology to determine the fair market
value of an oil or gas well for ad valorem taxes. 87
The oil and gas industry property tax experts and the assessors are
currently working on rules and regulations for the LTC to consider for
implementing the new provision. The proposals are anticipated to be
submitted to the LTC this summer during the LTCs annual review of its
rules. The expectation is that at least some rule provisions will be adopted
and become effective as of January 1, 2023. However, because the
amendment was approved by voters in November 2020, the new language
was effective for property tax years beginning January 1, 2021. Despite
the lack of formal rules, a taxpayer wishing to explore valuation using the
income approach for the 2021, 2022, and subsequent tax years should
discuss such with the assessor. Information supporting a valuation of the
properties using income information can be submitted with the appropriate
87. Act No. 368, 2020 La. Acts.
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LAT filing form or even through the ending date of the open rolls period,
and such information will be considered confidential pursuant to
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:2327.
VI. CHALLENGING AN ASSESSMENT: CORRECTNESS OR LEGALITY?
As explained by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the case of Gisclair,
Louisiana constitutional and statutory law formulates a two-track
procedure that must be adhered to in challenging property tax
assessments. 88 One track encompasses challenges to the “correctness of
assessments” by the assessor, while the other track covers challenges to
the legality of the tax levied.89 Accordingly, under our jurisprudence,
challenges to ad valorem property tax assessments are categorized either
as challenges to the “correctness of assessments” or challenges to the
“legality of assessments.” 90
The Gisclair Opinion quotes Morgan’s Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co.,
in which the Court explained the distinction to be drawn between (1) suits
to correct an assessment and (2) suits which go to the inherent validity of
an assessment, and to the legality of the tax based thereon. 91 Suits
challenging the correctness of an assessment are “suits in which an
assessment is complained of, and attacked for over-valuation and
misdescription of the property listed, involving merely the regularity or
correctness of the assessment.” 92 Suits challenging the validity of the
assessment or legality of the tax are those actions “attacking an assessment
as void on account of radical defects, and drawing into question, not the
correctness merely of an assessment, but the existence itself of any valid
assessment.” 93 The Court explained, “In the first class of cases, the attack,
if successful, results not in destroying, but in reducing or correcting, the
assessment; whereas in the second class of cases the radical defects made
the basis of attack, if found to exist, render the assessment null.” 94

88. Gisclair v. La. Tax Comm’n, 16 So. 3d 1132, 1135 (La. 2009) (citing
Triangle Marine, Inc. v. Savoie, 681 So. 2d 937, 939 (La. 1996)).
89. Id. (quoting Triangle, 681 So. 2d at 939).
90. See ANR Pipeline Co. v. La. Tax Comm'n, 851 So. 2d 1145, 1148–49
(La. 2003).
91. Gisclair, 16 So. 3d 1136 (citing Morgan’s Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co.
v. Pecot, 23 So. 948, 950–51 (La. 1898)).
92. Id. (quoting Morgan’s Louisiana, 23 So. at 950–51).
93. Id. (quoting Morgan’s Louisiana, 23 So. at 950–51).
94. Id. (quoting Morgan’s Louisiana, 23 So. at 950–51).
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The Gisclair opinion also cites Soniat v. Board of State Affairs, 95 for
the proposition that any challenge that seeks to correct some aspect of the
assessment is a correctness challenge if that challenge does not seek to
annul the assessment in toto.
The nature of the challenge—either correctness or legality—dictates
the body in which our constitution grants jurisdiction to hear and resolve
property tax disputes. 96 The LTC has original jurisdiction over challenges
to the correctness of an assessment; the courts are granted appellate
jurisdiction. 97 The district court has original jurisdiction over challenges
to the legality of an assessment. 98 Note that Act No. 343 of the 2021
Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature added the Louisiana Board
of Tax Appeals as an additional venue for judicial review of decisions by
the LTC.
The very large majority of property tax disputes in Louisiana are
challenges to the correctness of an assessment; legality challenges occur
much less frequently. This Article focuses on challenges to the correctness
of an assessment.
VII. CHALLENGING THE CORRECTNESS OF AN ASSESSMENT
The Louisiana Constitution requires layers of review for correctness
challenges, stating: “The correctness of assessments by the assessor shall
be subject to review first by the parish governing authority, then by the
Louisiana Tax Commission or its successor, and finally by the courts, all
in accordance with procedures established by law.” 99 This provision is the
constitutional umbrella under which the LTC derives its power of review.
The local boards of review “consider [a taxpayer’s] written or oral
complaint” concerning the correctness of an assessment; 100 the LTC
considers the appeal of any taxpayer dissatisfied with the determination of
the local board of review; 101 and the district and appellate courts review

95. Soniat v. Bd. of State Affs., 83 So. 760 (La. 1919).
96. See id. at 1135.
97. Id. at 1136 (citing ANR Pipeline Co. v. La. Tax Comm'n, 851 So. 2d
1145, 1149 (La. 2003); Triangle Marine Inc. v. Savoie, 681 So. 2d 937, 939 (La.
1996)).
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(E)); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt.
5, § 101(E).
100. LA. REV. STAT. 47:1992(C) (2021).
101. Id. §§ 47:1992(D), 47:1989(A)–(D).
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the decisions of the LTC. 102 The LTC has a constitutional and statutory
mandate to review and correct erroneous assessments and is responsible
for administering and enforcing all laws related to the state supervision of
local property tax assessments. 103
A. Board of Review
Generally, the parish governing authority sitting as the Board of
Review (“BOR”) is the Parish Police Jury or Parish Council. 104 The BOR
must conduct public hearings for all persons or their representatives
desiring to be heard on the assessments of property. 105 The parish
governing authority conducts the BOR “public hearing” during one of its
regularly scheduled monthly meetings. The BOR portion of the meeting
typically lasts only a few minutes and is very informal. No evidentiary
hearing is required or offered. In practice, these “public hearings” are not
evidentiary hearings. The BOR does not take sworn testimony or enter
exhibits into evidence or issue written or oral findings of fact or conclusion
of law. The BOR does not exercise an adjudicatory function. Notably, the
LTC Rules provide: “The Board of Review does not transmit a record or
evidence to the Tax Commission. Any evidence or information that was
submitted to the Board of Review must be filed by the parties, to be
considered by the Tax Commission.” 106
The BOR may make a determination to increase or decrease the
assessment of real or personal property made by the assessor. 107 The BOR
almost always agrees with the assessor’s valuation. A timely appeal to the
BOR is mandatory under the Louisiana Constitution, and failure to timely
appeal to the BOR invalidates any effort by the taxpayer to contest the
property value as determined by the assessor. 108 Any taxpayer, assessor,
102. Id. § 47:1998(A)(1)(a), (b)(ii)(iii). Louisiana Revised Statutes § 47:1989,
regarding judicial review of LTC decisions, was amended by Act No. 343, 2021
La. Acts 2021 (eff. 1/1/2022) adding the Board of Tax Appeals as an alternative
venue to the district court for filing appeals of the LTC’s decisions.
103. See LA. CONST. art. VII, §18(E); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 47:1837, 47:1990;
Williams v. Opportunity Homes Ltd. P’ship, 240 So. 3d 161, 165 n.3 (La. 2018).
104. LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 3101(F).
105. Id.
106. LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 3102(P), § 3103(G)(14). Similar
language first appeared in the LTC Rules in 2002. LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61, pt. 5,
§ 3103(L) (“Evidence offered at the Board of Review is not forwarded to the Tax
Commission and must be submitted by the assessor/taxpayer in accordance with
filing procedures for written appeals.”).
107. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1992(C); LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 3101(G).
108. LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 3101(E)(1).
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or bona fide representative of an affected tax recipient body may appeal
the BOR determination to the LTC. 109 All determinations by the BOR are
final unless timely appealed to the LTC.110
B. Appeals to the Louisiana Tax Commission 111
Even though the LTC considers “appeals” from the local boards of
review and “reviews” the determinations of the board of review and
assessor, it acts in every way like a court of first resort. The law provides
that LTC hearings “shall be conducted in accordance with” Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 47:1989, the LAPA, and rules and regulations
established by the LTC. 112 The LTC’s Rules and Regulations provide for
an adjudicatory hearing in which the LTC serves as the trier of fact. 113 The
hearing before the LTC is intended to be a full evidentiary hearing with
sworn testimony and the orderly introduction of relevant documents. 114
The hearing entails: acceptance of evidence, allowance for pretrial
conferences, deposition testimony, opportunity for an official reporter,
witness testimony under oath, application of the Rules of Evidence, receipt
of documentary evidence, and subpoena power. 115 Also, the LAPA
contemplates that the LTC will judge the credibility of witnesses.116
109. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1989(B).
110. Id. § 47:1992(D); see also LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 3101(K) (“The
determination of the Board of Review shall be final unless appealed, in writing,
to the Tax Commission within 30 calendar days of the earlier of: (a) actual
delivery of the Board of Review decision; or (b) written transmission of the Board
of Review notice of determination.”). This LTC Rules amendment is effective for
tax year 2022. The prior version provided for a deadline for filing appeals with
the LTC of ten business days.
111. See LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1989.
112. Id. § 47:1989(C). This provision was amended in 2021. Act No. 343, 2021
La. Acts.
113. LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 3102–3103, 3105; see also Gisclair v.
Bunge Corp., 668 So. 2d 1179, 1183 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (“When an
administrative agency as the Louisiana Tax Commission is the trier of fact . . . .”);
Holiday Bossier Ltd. P’ship v. La. Tax Comm’n, 574 So. 2d 1280, 1285 (La. Ct.
App. 1991) (referring to the LTC as the trier-of-fact); Broussard v. La. Tax
Comm’n, 614 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (referring to the LTC as the
trier of fact).
114. See LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 3102–3103, 3105; see also D90
Energy, LLC v. Jefferson Davis Par. Bd. of Rev., No. 2020-C-00200, 2020 WL
6145158 (La. Oct. 20, 2020).
115. D90 Energy, 2020 WL 6145158, at *4 n.7.
116. See LA. REV. STAT. § 49:964(G)(6).
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Despite the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:1990
authorizing the LTC to change or correct assessments, 117 many parish
assessors have unsuccessfully advanced an argument that the LTC is
nothing more than an “intermediate” appellate body that merely has the
authority to “review” but not “correct” an assessment. Those arguments
have been squarely rejected by the Louisiana Supreme Court and by the
courts of appeal. 118 The assessors have also attempted to disrupt the LTC’s
ability to conduct a full evidentiary hearing by challenging the LTC’s
“ability to receive and consider evidence not previously submitted to the
Assessor” prior to the LTC hearing.119 The Louisiana Supreme Court
recently struck down that argument in the D90 Energy opinion stating, “If
the Commission can only review and consider the evidence submitted to
an assessor, a hearing is meaningless.” 120
In response to the D90 Energy opinion, the assessors prodded the
introduction of legislation during the 2021 Regular Legislative Session
proposing sweeping changes to the language of Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 47:1989, which governs the review of appeals by the
LTC. 121 Although the taxpayer-onerous original language in the bill was
somewhat tamed through the legislative process, the resulting provisions
create a much more burdensome, and arguably unfair, appeals process for
any person—business or individual—who challenges an assessment. 122
Taxpayers wishing to challenge their assessments need to be aware
that with some limited exceptions, the LTC hearing “shall be confined to
review of evidence presented to the assessor prior to the close of the
117. Id. § 47:1990 (“The tax commission may change or correct any and all
assessments of property for the purpose of taxation, in order to make the
assessments conform to the true and correct valuation, not to exceed its actual
cash value.”).
118. See, e.g., Williams v. Opportunity Homes Ltd. P’ship, 240 So. 3d 161
(La. 2018); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Pitre, 468 So. 2d 747, 754 (“[T]he Tax
Commission may not usurp the constitutional authority of an assessor by utilizing
factual data which was available to the taxpayer, yet withheld from the assessor.
This is not to say, however, that the Tax Commission cannot review and correct
an erroneous assessment.”); see also Metrailer v. Granger, 552 So. 2d 720, 723
(La. Ct. App. 1989) (citing LA. REV. STAT. §§ 47:1837, 47:1957) (holding that
the LTC’s authority in acting as a reviewing body is not its only function).
119. D90 Energy, 2020 WL 6145158, at *2, *4.
120. Id. at *7. The LTC has been conducting full evidentiary hearings since at
least 1978 when the first Rules/Regulations of the LTC were promulgated
regarding hearings.
121. See Act No. 343, 2021 La. Acts (introduced as House Bill No. 573).
122. See LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1989(C)(2), as amended by Act No. 343, 2021
La. Acts.
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deadline for filing a complaint with the board of review.” 123 That deadline
is normally within a few days of when the open rolls inspection period
closes, 124 and the LTC hearing may not be set until several or even many
months after that date. If a taxpayer wishes to introduce evidence that was
not provided to the assessor by the stated deadline, the taxpayer must make
application to the LTC to present the additional evidence prior to the
hearing, and the LTC must find that the additional evidence is material
and that there were good reasons for failure to timely present it to the
assessor. 125 Meaning that there now could be severe restrictions on the
introduction of evidence at the LTC hearing. 126
Section 3 of Act No. 343 specifically states that the provisions of the
Act amending Revised Statutes section 47:1989 “shall have prospective
effect only and shall not be applicable to any case actually pending before
the Louisiana Tax Commission or in any court on the effective date of the
Act.” 127 Accordingly, the LTC was forced to amend and promulgate two
sets of rules for its hearings—those for appeals filed before January 1,
2022 and those for appeals filed on or after January 1, 2022, which
incorporate the new legislative modifications to Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 47:1989. 128 Prior to the amendments enacted by Act No.
343, this statutory provision had not been amended since 2000, so the
procedures for conducting hearings at the LTC were well-settled. 129
In general, the Louisiana Rules of Evidence apply to LTC hearings. 130
Although the hearings are somewhat informal and the Rules of Evidence
are liberally applied, this hearing is the only opportunity for the taxpayer
to create a record of the dispute for further review by the courts.131 The
appellate courts will not conduct a new trial but will only review the
administrative record created before the LTC. 132
123. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1989(C)(2).
124. See id. § 47:1992.
125. See id. § 47:1989(C)(2).
126. See id.
127. Act No. 343, 2021 La. Acts.
128. LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 3102 (for appeals to the LTC filed before
January 1, 2022); id. § 3103 (for appeals to the LTC filed on or after January 1,
2022).
129. For more information, see the historical notes to Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 47:1989.
130. LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 3102–3103, 3105.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Williams v. Opportunity Homes Ltd. P’ship, 240 So. 3d 161,
166 (La. 2018) (citing Panacon v. La Tax Comm’n, So. 2d 572, 574 (citing LA.
REV. STAT. § 49:964(F)) (explaining that review is confined to the administrative
record established before the LTC.).

436

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. X

C. Judicial Review by District and Appellate Courts 133
Any taxpayer or bona fide representative of an affected tax-recipient
body dissatisfied with the final determination of the LTC has the right to
institute suit for judicial review of the LTC’s decision. 134 The petition for
judicial review must be filed within 30 days of any final decision by the
LTC either in (i) the district court of the parish where the LTC is domiciled
(19th Judicial District Court in East Baton Rouge Parish), (ii) the
Louisiana Board of Tax Appeals, or (iii) the district court of the parish
where the property is located. 135
Judicial review of the LTC’s decision is authorized by Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 47:1998 which provides that it is the LTC’s “final
determination” that is subject to review. The assessors’ argument that their
valuations are “entitled to deferential review” has been recently rejected
by the Louisiana Supreme Court "as the law provides for judicial review
of the administrative record established before the Commission and of the
final determinations made by the Commission." 136 The standard of review
for administrative bodies such as the LTC is set forth in LAPA. 137 The
extent of the judicial review of decisions of the LTC is governed by
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:964(F) and (G). 138 Section 964(F)
defines the “scope of review” (i.e., generally confined to the record); and
section 964(G) defines the “standard of review” (i.e., reversal or
modification of the agency decision under six enumerated
circumstances). 139 Judicial review of the LTC’s decisions by the district
court and appellate courts is confined to the administrative record
established before the LTC. 140
133. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:1998.
134. Id.
135. Id. Note that in 2021, the Louisiana Legislature added the Louisiana
Board of Tax Appeals as an additional venue for judicial review of decisions by
the LTC. Act No. 343, 2021 La. Acts.
136. D90 Energy, LLC v. Jefferson Davis Par. Bd. of Rev., No. 2020-C-00200,
2020 WL 6145158, at *5 (La. Oct. 20, 2020).
137. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:964(F), (G); D90 Energy, 2020 WL 6145158, at *5
n.9; see also ANR Pipeline Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., 73 So. 3d 398, 402 (La. Ct.
App. 2011).
138. Williams v. Opportunity Homes Ltd. P’ship, 240 So. 3d 161, 165–67 (La.
2018); see also D90 Energy, 2020 WL 6145158, at *5.
139. D90 Energy, 2020 WL 6145158, at *5; Williams, 240 So. 3d at 165.
140. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:964(F); Williams, 240 So. 3d at 166 (citing Panacon
v. La. Tax Comm’n, 747 So. 2d at 574); see also D90 Energy, 2020 WL 6145158,
at *5.
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A court's review of the evidence presented at LTC hearings is limited
to the purpose of determining whether the hearing was conducted in
accordance with authority and formalities of statute, whether the factfindings of the LTC were supported by substantial evidence, and whether
the LTC’s conclusions from such findings were arbitrary or constituted an
abuse of the hearing body's discretion. 141
Review by both the District Court and the Court of Appeal is governed
by Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:964(G). 142 That statute provides
that the courts may either affirm the decision of the agency, or remand the
case for further proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision. To reverse
or modify the decision, the substantial rights of the appellant must have
been prejudiced because the agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2)
in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful
procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) arbitrary or capricious,
or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion; or (6) not supported and sustainable by a preponderance of
evidence. 143
D. Payment Under Protest 144
Any taxpayer in the state who challenges an assessment or has filed
suit and whose taxes have become due must timely pay those taxes under
protest and notify the sheriff (tax collector), the assessor, and the LTC of
the protest and their intent to appeal any adverse rulings. 145 The sheriff is
required to hold the payment under protest until the valuation dispute is
resolved through settlement or after a court appeals process 146. If the
payment under protest is not timely, the taxpayer may forfeit their right to
challenge the assessment—not before the LTC, but for judicial review of
the LTC’s decision. 147
141. See Warren Energy Res., Inc. v. La. Tax Comm’n, 825 So. 2d 572, 575
(La. Ct. App. 2002).
142. See, e.g., TBM-WC Sabine, LLC v. Sabine Parish Bd. of Rev., 250 So.
3d 1075, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 2018); ANR Pipeline Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., 851
So. 2d 1145 (La. 2003); Warren, 825 So. 2d at 575–76; Broussard v. La. Tax
Comm’n, 614 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
143. LA. REV. STAT. §49:964(G)(1)–(6).
144. Id. § 47:2134.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. D90 Energy, LLC v. Jefferson Davis Par. Bd. of Rev., No. 2020-C-00200,
2020 WL 6145158, at *7 (La. Oct. 20, 2020) (“[P]ayment under protest is required
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A taxpayer challenging the correctness or legality of an assessment
must timely pay the disputed amount of tax due under protest. 148 The
portion of the taxes paid by the taxpayer that is neither in dispute nor the
subject of a suit contesting the correctness or legality of the assessment
will not be made subject to the protest. 149 The taxpayer is required to
submit separate payments for the disputed amount of tax due and for the
amount not in dispute and not subject to the protest. 150
A suit challenging the “legality” of an assessment must be filed within
30 days of the date of the protested payment. 151 If at the time of payment
of the protested tax, a suit challenging the “correctness” of an assessment
is not already pending, then a suit seeking recovery of the protested
payment need not be filed until 30 days from the date a final decision is
rendered by the LTC. 152
VIII. JURISPRUDENCE
A. Recent Cases for Oil & Gas and Other Mineral Properties
On October 20, 2020, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued a ruling on
an oil and gas well property ad valorem tax case. 153 This decision is a key
Louisiana tax case regarding the scope of authority possessed by tax
assessors in ad valorem tax matters and the Louisiana Tax Commission as
a reviewing body. 154
before institution of suit, not for taxpayers who are successful before the
Commission . . . payment under protest is tethered to judicial review of the
Commission’s decision, and there is no corresponding statute or commission rule
requiring such payment to receive Board or Commission review.”).
148. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2134. During the 2022 Regular Session, LOGA was
very instrumental promoting the passage of SB 241, which adds language
confirming that a taxpayer is not required to make a payment under protest while
a correctness challenge is pending before the LTC. The bill also adds additional
language to ease the burden of a taxpayer where a payment under protest is
required and offers a taxpayer an alternative to payment under protest for both
correctness and legality challenges. If signed by the Governor, the language will
be effective immediately for the 2022 tax year.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. § 47:2134(C).
152. Id. § 47:2134(B).
153. See D90 Energy, LLC v. Jefferson Davis Par. Bd. of Rev., No. 2020-C00200, 2020 WL 6145158 (La. Oct. 20, 2020).
154. Notably, the Louisiana Oil and Gas Association (“LOGA”) filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of the taxpayer, D90 Energy.
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Under the facts of D90 Energy, in October 2012, D90 Energy, a multistate, independent oil and gas operator, purchased two gas wells and one
salt-water disposal well for $100,000. 155 Facing a fair market valuation by
the assessor of over $3 million for the 2013 and 2014 tax years, D90 paid
a total of approximately $110,000 in disputed (under protest) and
undisputed taxes for the first two tax years (2013 and 2014)—more than it
paid for the property—and appealed the assessor’s decisions to the LTC. 156
D90 Energy did not pay the taxes under protest for the last two tax years—
2015 and 2016—because the taxes were unaffordable and it had prevailed
at the LTC for the previous years. 157
D90 relied on the purchase price of $100,000 as a measure of FMV
for the three wells until 2016, where it sought the 90% reduction provided
for shut-in wells under LTC Rules and Regulations. 158 The assessor
determined FMV by using the tables in the LTC Rules and Regulations
providing estimated “cost new” values for well properties, but the assessor
refused to consider any adjustments for allowance of economic
obsolescence based on the $100,000 purchase price and the subsequent
shut-in of the wells. 159
D90 submitted the following to the Jefferson Davis Parish Assessor
for each tax year 2013 through 2015:
(1) the Assignment, Conveyance and Bill of Sale executed
October 17, 2012 and effective October 1, 2012, transferring the
wells to D90 for ‘Ten and No/100 Dollars ($10.00) and other good
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which
are hereby acknowledged’; (2) a copy of the front and back of
D90’s $100,000.00 check to the seller, Goldking Resources, LLC,
dated the same day as the sale; and (3) emails between the broker
for the sale and Daniel Silverman, the president of D90,
documenting the negotiated $100,000.00 purchase price. 160
At the LTC hearing, D90 submitted testimony evidence "to support its
claim that the wells were over-valued by the Assessor, including
substantiation that: the sale price was $100,000.00; the sale was arms-

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

D90 Energy, 2020 WL 6145158, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1 n.2, *3 n.5.
Id. at *1.
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length; the wells were 'marginal' and 'incapable of producing gas’; and the
wells were 'shut-in' in 2016.” 161
The LTC ruled in favor of D90 Energy in three separate hearings
covering the four tax years. In these rulings, the LTC assigned a value of
$235,000 for each of the 2013, 2014, and 2015 tax years, considering (1)
the purchase price of $100,000 and (2) the estimated plug and abandon
liability costs of $135,000 for the three wells. 162 For the 2016 tax year, the
LTC calculated a value of $145,000 based on a 90% shut-in reduction in
the purchase price to $10,000, and an additional $135,000 for the plug and
abandon liability costs. 163 For all of the tax years, the LTC reduced the
FMV, heavily relying on a LTC regulation requiring valid, properly
documented sales to be considered by an assessor as a measure of FMV. 164
The assessor’s suits for judicial review were consolidated by the
District Court in Jefferson Davis Parish. 165 The district court affirmed the
LTC decisions, finding no basis to overturn. 166 The assessor then appealed
to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal, which reversed the District
Court and the LTC’s decisions and reinstated the Board of Review’s
decisions to set FMV according to the Assessor’s original valuations. 167
The Third Circuit reasoned that the LTC should have afforded the
assessor’s determination of value “much discretion.” 168 Consequently, the
Third Circuit overturned the LTC’s finding that the arms-length sale price
of $100,000, together with future plugging and abandonment costs, should
be the measure of FMV—as opposed to the ordinary tax tables—in this oil
and gas property valuation matter. 169
Additionally, for the 2015 and 2016 tax years, the Third Circuit found
that D90 Energy had no right to appeal the FMV determination as no
payment under protest was ever made for those specific years. 170 The
161. Id. at *5. D90’s president testified under oath that he paid $100,000 for
the property, that the property had been listed on the open market, and that the
sale was fairly negotiated, and the plug and abandon cost of $45,000 per well was
established by uncontroverted testimony. Id. at *6.
162. Id. at *1.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *5 (“Sales, properly documented, should be considered by the
assessor as fair market value, provided the sale meets all tests relative to it being
a valid. sale.”); see also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 907(A)(6)(e) (2021).
165. Id. at *2.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See D90 Energy, LLC v. Jefferson Davis Par. Bd. of Rev., 289 So. 3d
615, 633, (La. Ct. App. 2019), rev’d, D90 Energy, 2020 WL 6145158.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 636.
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assessor filed an exception of no right of action asserting that because D90
failed to pay the disputed tax amounts under protest for the 2015 and 2016
tax years, it was barred from disputing the valuations and assessments for
those years. 171
D90 Energy’s writ to the Louisiana Supreme Court was granted, and
in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Crain, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed the Third Circuit’s decision and reinstated the LTC’s
decisions in favor of D90 Energy. 172 The Supreme Court found that the
LTC properly corrected the assessor’s FMV determination by considering
the recent arm’s-length sale from the seller to D90 Energy, that the LTC
possessed the authority to correct the assessor’s valuation, and the record
supported the correction. 173 The recent sale, as opposed to regulatory tax
tables, was a proper measure of value for D90 Energy’s well properties
under the facts. 174 The Court also found that the LTC was not limited to
reviewing only the information provided to the assessor, but they could
also take evidence, hear testimony, and consider the administrative record
established before it in an appeal of an assessor’s FMV determination. The
assessor argued that “the Constitution grants him the exclusive right to
determine fair market value,” and that the LTC’s valuations deserved no
deference. 175 The Court found that the Louisiana Constitution clearly
provided the LTC the right of review, and that the evidentiary hearing
required by law in an appeal to the LTC indicated the LTC could hear new
evidence as part of its responsibilities. 176 The Court noted, “If the
Commission can only review and consider the evidence submitted to an
assessor, a hearing is meaningless.” 177
The Court distinguished the facts of the D90 Energy case from the
Dow v. Pitre case. 178 In Dow, 179 “the court warned against a taxpayer
manipulating the system by withholding information from the assessor in
order to seek a more favorable valuation from” the LTC. 180 However,
nothing suggests D90 did this in the present case. 181 In fact for 2013 and
2014, the LTC found D90’s “information adequately documenting the sale
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 619.
See D90 Energy, 2020 WL 6145158, at *1.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4.
See id. at *4.
Dow Chem. Co. v. Pitre, 468 So. 2d 747, 754 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
D90 Energy, 2020 WL 6145158, at *4.
Id.
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was timely furnished to the Jefferson Davis Assessor’s Office.” 182 If that
initial submission was lacking or needed clarification, the law allows the
presentation of evidence before the LTC to “establish[] the fair market
value of [the] property.” 183 The Court stated, “This statutory scheme
within the described constitutional framework for assessment and review
guarantees the due process rights of the taxpayer by affording a
meaningful opportunity to challenge the assessor’s valuations.” 184 Further,
it explained, “There is no evidence that D90 attempted to usurp the
assessor’s authority”; rather, before the LTC, it “submit[ted] evidence that
[it believed] established fair market value.” 185
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed the effect of a taxpayer’s failure
to pay under protest when it is successful at a LTC hearing, finding such
payment under protest is not required to preserve a taxpayer’s right to
dispute a valuation and assessment when the taxpayer prevails before the
LTC. 186
Reading together Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 47:1998 and
47:2134(B)(1), the Court determined that these statutes provide that
“payment under protest is required before institution of suit, not for
taxpayers who are successful before the Commission.” 187 In this case, the
assessor, not D90, filed suit in district court challenging the LTC’s
decision. 188 Payment under protest is tethered to judicial review of the
LTC’s decision, and no corresponding statute or LTC rule requires such
payment to receive LTC review. 189 The assessor’s judicial challenge under
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:1998 did not create an obligation
for D90 to protest a tax with which it agreed. 190
A matter strikingly similar to D90 Energy, but on a larger scale, is
currently pending in the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal. Perdido
Energy Louisiana, LLC purchased a group of wells in five Parishes
(Acadia, Beauregard, Evangeline, Rapides, Vernon) for approximately
$4,000,000, and the assessors placed a collective value on those properties

182. Id.
183. Id.; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 3103(D)(4) (2021).
184. D90 Energy, 2020 WL 6145158, at *4 (citing Martin v. ANR Pipeline
Co., 76 So. 3d 534, 541 (La. Ct. App. 2011)).
185. D90 Energy, 2020 WL 6145158, at *4.
186. Id. at *7.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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of nearly $59,000,000. 191 A decision by the First Circuit is expected this
summer.
Two decisions of the First Circuit involving brine mining wells and
salt caverns recently became final. The matters of Axiall 192 and Blue
Cube 193 were substantially similar disputes concerning the valuation and
assessment of active brine mining wells and related salt caverns in
Assumption Parish. In both cases, the brine mining wells were located over
a salt deposit. 194 The brine produced from the wells was pumped by
pipelines to each company’s respective plant in Plaquemine, Louisiana,
where the brine was used to make various products. 195 The caverns within
the salt mass were created as a byproduct of the mining operations; the
purpose of the mining was not to create the cavern. 196 The companies did
not store, nor intend to store or have the legal right to store any
hydrocarbons or other products in the salt caverns. 197 The benefit for the
companies is the salt extracted, not the resulting cavern.198 Further, the
Department of Natural Resources has never permitted the caverns to be
used for commercial storage; rather, it has exclusively permitted the brine
mining wells and associated caverns for use in the mining of brine
(solution mining only). 199
The facts of the two cases diverge slightly in connection with the salt
caverns. If Axiall sought to store hydrocarbons in the caverns, it would
legally be unable to do so because the cavern walls were too close in
proximity to meet the requirements of the Department of Natural
Resources’ regulations for hydrocarbon storage. 200 Blue Cube did not have
the legal right to use the caverns for storage due to contractual restrictions
with the owners of the land where the caverns are located. 201
191. State of Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit Docket No. 2022-CA0115 c/w 2022-CA-0116, c/w 2022-CA-0117, c/w 2022-CA-0118 c/w 2022-CA0119; 19th Judicial District Court, Division 25, Parish of East Baton Rouge, State
of Louisiana, Docket Number 693,700 c/w 693,701 c/w 693,702 c/w 693,703 c/w
693,704.
192. Axiall, LLC v. Assumption Par. Bd. of Rev., 302 So. 3d 1136, (La. Ct.
App. 2019), writ denied, 307 So. 3d 202 (La. 2020).
193. Blue Cube Operations, LLC v. Assumption Par. Bd. of Rev., 315 So. 3d
887 (La. Ct. App. 2020).
194. Id. at 888; Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1139.
195. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 888; Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1139.
196. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 888; Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1139.
197. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 888; Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1139.
198. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 888; Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1139.
199. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 893; Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1139.
200. Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1139.
201. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 893.
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The Axiall and Blue Cube matters differ in the procedural paths for
review by the First Circuit. Axiall appealed to the Tax Commission in
2014, 2015, and 2016, which ruled in Axiall’s favor. 202 The assessor filed
for judicial review to the District Court of Assumption Parish, contesting
the Commission’s decisions. 203 For purposes of judicial review, the
appeals were consolidated, and the district court held a hearing in
November 2017. 204 The district court reversed and vacated the
Commission’s decisions, affirming the correctness of the assessments for
the tax years by reinstating the Assumption Parish Board of Review’s
ruling. 205 Axiall appealed the district’s court ruling to the First Circuit. 206
Blue Cube disputed the 2016 tax year valuation and assessment of the
brine wells and related salt caverns, and the LTC ruled in its favor. 207 The
assessor appealed the LTC’s decision to the Assumption Parish District
Court. 208 Before the matter could proceed, Blue Cube was back before the
LTC for a hearing regarding its 2017 tax year valuation and assessment. 209
Based on the exact same evidence as the 2016 tax year, the LTC “reversed
course” in the 2017 tax appeal, finding for the assessor. 210 The LTC upheld
the assessor’s FMV determination of Blue Cube’s brine wells and caverns
in a decision clearly not supported by the testimony or the preponderance
of the evidence.211 Blue Cube appealed the LTC’s decision to the District
Court of East Baton Rouge Parish, which upheld the LTCs decision. 212
Blue Cube then appealed the district court’s ruling to the First Circuit.213
Regardless of the slight factual and procedural differences, the
primary issues in these cases before the First Circuit were the same:
whether the brine wells should be taxed under Chapter 25 (LTC Rules for
general business assets), as argued by the assessor, or Chapter 9 (LTC
Rules for oil, gas, and other wells), as argued by the taxpayer companies,
202. Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1138.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 893–95 (discussing of the LTC’s ruling in favor
of Blue Cube for the 2016 tax year).
208. 23rd Judicial District Court, Parish of Assumption, Docket No. 36,610,
Division C.
209. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 891. The LTC heard the 2016 tax year dispute
on December 13, 2017, and the 2017 tax year dispute on August 22, 2018.
210. Id. at 895.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 888.
213. Id.
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and further, whether the caverns had any value at all and therefore subject
to taxation. 214 Chapter 9 specifically includes service wells, including
injection wells. 215 Within the LTC’s classifications of property, a sub-class
description includes injection wells, which are defined as “injection wells,
service wells, saltwater disposal, brine wells, water wells.” 216 The term
“injection well” does not appear do not appear anywhere else in the LTC’s
rules. 217
The First Circuit, quoting from the LTC’s own decisions, noted that
the LTC has consistently valued brine wells under Chapter 9 of the LTC’s
Rules and Regulations. 218 Additionally, the LTC has evaluated the
correctness of the valuation and assessment of salt caverns by their actual
and potential commercial use and determined that the caverns have no
distinct commercial value apart from the brining operations, nor do they
have any value distinct from the land. 219 The LTC has further determined
that until the process to convert the caverns for the storage of hydrocarbons
and other products is completed, the caverns are simply holes in the ground
without any inherent additional commercial value. 220 The LTC Rules do
not provide for valuation and taxation of caverns that are voids in the
ground. 221 Accordingly, the LTC determined the caverns have no value
separate from the land. 222
In Axiall, the First Circuit reversed the district court and reinstated the
LTC’s decisions that the brine wells should be valued under Chapter 9
rather than Chapter 25, finding the caverns had no value. 223 In Blue Cube,
the First Circuit relied heavily on its ruling in Axiall to reverse the district
court’s judgment affirming the LTC’s decision in the 2017 tax year appeal
214. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 891; Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1143.
215. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 892; Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1143; LA.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 901 (2021).
216. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 892; Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1143–44; LA.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 304(B).
217. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 892; Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1144.
218. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 893.
219. Id. at 894.
220. Id. at 894–95.
221. Id. at 893; Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1144. In contrast, the LTC Rules, in
Chapter 25, do provide a procedure for the valuation of “Salt Dome Storage Wells
and Caverns permitted at Class II Type 10, 11-L or 11-N” (hydrocarbon storage).
See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, §§ 2501(H), 2503 (2021). The wells and
caverns at issue in these matters have only ever been permitted for the mining of
brine, which does not fall into the specific class designations above.
222. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 895.
223. Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1138, 1145.
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and to reverse the determination of the LTC. 224 In its Blue Cube ruling, the
First Circuit quoted much of its prior decision in Axiall and also further
declared that the LTC “failed to articulate any basis for its reversal in
interpretation of the rules and regulations with regard to valuing the brine
wells.” 225
The assessor filed a writ application to the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Axiall, and it was denied in December 2020. 226 The assessor did not
seek a writ to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Blue Cube.
The LTC has received proposals for several years from the LA
Assessor’s Association suggesting that brine mining wells and salt cavern
properties should be valued under Chapter 25 (general business assets),
rather than Chapter 9 (Oil, Gas, and Other Wells), and the LTC has
rejected those proposals to date.227 However, the LTC has noted during the
last several years of its annual rules meetings that brine mining wells may
deserve a separate Chapter within the Louisiana Tax Commission Rules
for valuation, and that addition may be forthcoming in the near future.
B. Burden of Proof of Obsolescence
Louisiana courts have long held that the party seeking obsolescence
bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence to the assessor. 228
Although Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:2324 requires the assessor
to gather all data necessary to properly determine the fair market value of
property, it is the party seeking a fair market value reduction for its
property based on obsolescence who has the burden of producing
sufficient data and information to substantiate its claim. 229
224. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d at 896.
225. Id.
226. See Axiall, LLC v. Assumption Par. Bd. of Rev., 307 So. 3d 202 (La. 2020).
227. Blue Cube, 315 So. 3d 887 n.2; Axiall, LLC, 302 So. 3d 1136 n.5; see also
Commission Members: Proposals, LA. TAX. COMM’N, https://www.latax.state.la
.us/Menu_RulesRegulations/RulesRegulations.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
228. Dow Chem. Co. v. Pitre, 468 So. 2d 747 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Bailey v.
Enervest Operating Co., LLC, 43 So. 3d 1046 (La. Ct. App. 2010). Although both
the Dow and EnerVest opinions confirm that the burden of proving obsolescence
is on the taxpayer, the cases are distinguishable as the court in the Dow matter
found that Dow intentionally withheld information from the assessor, whereas the
court in Enervest determined that the taxpayer provided sufficient data to the
assessor in support of its obsolescence claim; see also Jones v. S. Nat. Gas Co.,
63 So. 3d 1080 (La. Ct. App. 2011); Odom v. S. Nat. Gas Co., 72 So. 3d 437 (La.
Ct. App. 2011).
229. Regency Intrastate Gas, LLC v. La. Tax Comm'n, 329 So. 3d 838, 845
(La. Ct. App. 2021), writ denied, 331 So. 3d 320 (La. 2022).
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The most recent reported decision discussing obsolescence for
pipeline property is Regency Intrastate Gas, LLC v. Louisiana Tax
Commission. 230 In the Regency case, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal concluded that Regency Intrastate Gas ("RIG”), failed to carry its
burden of proving entitlement to a FMV reduction for its pipeline property
based on economic obsolescence for the 2018 tax year. 231 At the LTC
hearing, RIG argued that the best evidence of FMV is the purchase price
paid in a recent sale, and the 2018 purchase price of RIG’s property
showed that (i) its pipeline system’s throughput was significantly below
capacity, (ii) about 2/3 of the value of the property had been written off by
its CPA firm, who also doubted RIG’s viability as an ongoing concern,
and (iii) RIG’s transportation contracts would expire in the near future. 232
The LTC determined that RIG’s economic obsolescence request was
based almost entirely on the book value of the property, and the reliance
place by RIG on the book value as a measure of FMV was flawed. 233 The
First Circuit, after evaluating the record created at the LTC, concluded that
the LTC “did not arbitrarily and capriciously disregard RIG’s
obsolescence evidence,” nor did the LTC act arbitrarily or capriciously in
“refusing to consider RIG’s future revenue losses in the determination of
its pipeline property’s 2018 fair market value.” 234 Finally, the court
concluded that “the sale of an undefined partnership interest does not
establish fair market value” as is defined in Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 47:2321. 235 RIG sought a writ to the Louisiana Supreme Court for
review of the First Circuit’s ruling, and the writ application was denied in
January 2022. 236
In Dow, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court’s finding that the LTC should not have considered Dow’s
independent appraisal in its review of the assessment of its machinery,
equipment, and pipelines. 237 Under the facts of Dow, the taxpayer
introduced evidence (an independent appraisal) at the LTC hearing to
support its claim for obsolescence. 238 Dow had refused to provide a portion

230. See id. at 838.
231. Id. at 847.
232. Id. at 845–46.
233. Id. at 846.
234. Id. at 846–47.
235. Id. at 847.
236. See Regency Intrastate Gas, LLC v. La. Tax Comm'n, 331 So. 3d 320
(La. 2022).
237. Dow Chem. Co. v. Pitre, 468 So. 2d 747, 754 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
238. Id. at 749.
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of the appraisal report to the assessor. 239 Even when the assessor requested
the missing information, Dow did not comply. 240 The LTC then modified
the assessment based on the appraisal, even though the appraisal had been
intentionally withheld from the assessor. 241
The First Circuit agreed with the trial court that efforts by the assessor
to obtain certain appraisal information from Dow were either resisted
entirely or completely frustrated by making access to the information
unreasonably onerous, and Dow had withheld information from the
assessor without just cause. 242 Both the trial court and the appellate court
found that the LTC erred in using the appraisal to modify the
assessment. 243
In Bailey v. EnerVest Operating Co., LLC, the Louisiana Second
Circuit Court of Appeal found “that when an assessor changes a policy or
procedure regarding the information to be provided by a taxpayer then the
assessor should take steps to inform the taxpayer of what information is
required before completing the determination of FMV and the
assessment.” 244
Under the facts of EnerVest, the company requested an obsolescence
reduction to the fair market value of its pipelines and submitted detailed
information in support of its request. 245 At the LTC hearing, the assessor
testified that he denied the company’s request for obsolescence due to lack
of supporting financial documentation. 246 The assessor also admitted that
his office did not request the financial information from the company.247
Although the court noted that the assessor was correct in asserting that
a taxpayer does not have an unqualified right to an obsolescence reduction
in FMV, the court distinguished EnerVest from Dow:
Unlike the situation in Dow, supra, the record shows that
EnerVest provided sufficient data in support of its claim to
Assessor Bailey. In reviewing and correcting the assessment to
grant a reduction for obsolescence, the LTC did not rely on data
withheld from Assessor Bailey. Rather, the LTC found that
239. Id. at 754.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Bailey v. EnerVest Operating Co., LLC, 43 So. 3d 1046, 1057 (La. Ct.
App. 2010).
245. Id. at 1048.
246. Id. at 1049.
247. Id.
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Assessor Bailey did not take EnerVest’s documentation of
obsolescence into account in making the assessment. It appears
that the LTC concluded that the denial of EnerVest’s obsolescence
request was part of a policy to deny obsolescence to all pipeline
owners that year. 248
The Second Circuit reinstated the ruling of the LTC regarding the
valuations and assessments of EverVest’s pipeline property. 249 In reaching
its decision, the Second Circuit took into consideration that (i) the record
showed EnerVest provided the assessor with sufficient documentation to
support its claim of obsolescence, (ii) the LTC found the assessor had
granted EnerVest’s requests for obsolescence in prior years and then
denied it in the 2007 tax year, and (iii) the assessor asserted that he was
forced to change his policy and procedure regarding obsolescence
following the Crosstex 250 decision in which he was a party. 251
In the cases of Jones v. Southern Natural Gas 252 and Odom v. Southern
Natural Gas, 253 the taxpayers, natural gas pipeline companies, argued the
LTC and district courts erred in placing the burden of proof of
obsolescence on the taxpayers. To support their argument, the taxpayers
cited Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:2324 which provides in
pertinent part: “Each assessor shall gather all data necessary to properly
determine the fair market value of property subject to taxation within his
respective parish.” 254 The taxpayers argued that this statute imposes a
mandatory duty on the assessor, and if the assessor finds the information
submitted by the taxpayer inadequate, the assessor is required to request
additional supporting data. 255 Relying on EnerVest, the taxpayers argued
that “an assessor has a mandatory duty to gather data to determine fair
market value and to inform the taxpayer of the information required after
a change in policy,” so “the assessors should also have been required to
inform the taxpayers of the applicable policies concerning obsolescence
the first time they submitted their tax forms.” 256 The taxpayers argued their

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1057.
See Crosstex v. Bailey, 936 So. 2d 886 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
EnerVest, 43 So. 3d 1056.
Jones v. S. Nat. Gas Co., 63 So. 3d 1080 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
Odom v. S. Nat. Gas Co., 72 So. 3d 437 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
LA. REV. STAT. § 47:2324 (2021).
Jones, 63 So. 3d at 1087.
Odom, 72 So. 3d at 442.
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situations were analogous to EnerVest and thus warranted a finding that
the assessors failed to meet their burden of proof. 257
Both courts in Odom and Jones rejected the taxpayers’ arguments and
determined neither EnerVest nor any other case cited by the taxpayers
imposes such a duty on the assessors. 258 Rather, the LTC guidelines
require the taxpayers to substantiate in writing the evidence put forth to
show obsolescence. 259 In concluding the taxpayers have the burden of
proving obsolescence, the Odom court adopted the prior discussion of this
same issue in Jones. 260
Asserting the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in
TBM-WC Sabine, the assessors have claimed “great discretion” whether to
allow for reductions for obsolescence. 261 Nowhere in the Constitution,
Revised Statutes, or LTC Rules and Regulations does the law give the
assessor “discretion,” let alone “great discretion” with respect to whether
to allow a reduction for obsolescence. In fact, the LTC Rules use the words
“should” or “shall” in almost every obsolescence provision. 262 The
assessors have also unsuccessfully argued that “use of the word ‘should’
[in the LTC Regulations regarding the granting of obsolescence] denotes
discretion and cannot be construed as ‘shall.’” 263 Indeed, the words “shall”
and “should” in the LTC Rules and Regulations are mandatory in
connotation. 264
The discretion argument of the assessors appears to have been brought
about from a fluctuation in the language of the LTC Rules regarding the
257. Jones, 63 So. 3d at 1087.
258. Odom, 72 So. 3d at 442.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. TBM-WC Sabine, LLC v. Sabine Par. Bd. of Rev., (La. App. 3 Cir.
7/18/18), 250 So. 3d 1075, 1082 (La. Ct. App. 2018) (finding that the taxpayer
had not shown that the assessor abused her “great discretion”).
262. See, e.g., LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 907(A), (C)(5), (Oil, Gas, and
Other Wells); id. § 1101(E)(1) (Drilling Rigs and Related Equipment); id. §§
1301(A)(2) and 1305(F) (Pipelines) (“Functional and/or economic obsolescence
shall be considered in the analysis of fair market value as substantiated by the
taxpayer in writing”); see also LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 701(B)(3)
(Watercraft) (“Upon a showing of evidence of such loss, substantiated by the
taxpayer in writing, economic or functional obsolescence shall be given.”).
263. D90 Energy, LLC v. Jefferson Davis Par. Bd. of Rev., No. 2020-C-00200,
2020 WL 6145158, at *5 (La. Oct. 20, 2020); see also LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 61,
pt. 5, § 907(A)(6)(e), (C)(6) (“Sales, properly documented, should be considered
by the assessor as fair market value, provided the sale meets all tests relative to it
being a valid sale.”).
264. LA. REV. STAT. § 1:3 (“The word ‘shall’ is mandatory.”).
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valuation of pipeline properties. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal in ANR Pipeline Co. explained that through 1999, the LTC's
guidelines relating to valuation of pipeline properties provided that
“economic and functional obsolescence shall be given,” and, “should be
recognized.” 265 In 1999, however, the regulations were amended to the
more permissive “may be recognized.” 266
In ANR, the court reasoned that “[r]egardless of whether the assessor
is mandated to recognize economic obsolescence, he still retained the
discretion to determine whether the taxpayer has substantiated that
obsolescence.” 267 The court specifically limited its holding, however, to
provide that “[t]he determination of whether the information provided is
satisfactory rests within the sound discretion of the assessor subject to
review on several levels.” 268 Thus, the assessor must have engaged in
265. ANR Pipeline Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., 73 So. 3d 398, 405 (La. Ct. App.
2011) (emphasis added).
266. ANR Pipeline involved assessment for the year 1994 through 2003. Id. at
399. The challenge related to adjustments for economic obsolescence due to
decreased throughput. Id. at 400. The court explained that through 1999, the LAC
provided in title 61, part 5, § 1301 provided that “economic and functional
obsolescence shall be given,” and “should be recognized.” Id. at 403. In 1999, the
language was changed to the more permissive “may be recognized.” Id. A review
of the regulations relating to economic obsolescence for reductions in throughput,
evidence that in 1991, LAC title 61, part 5, § 1305(F) provided that “[u]pon a
showing of evidence of such loss, substantiated by the taxpayer in writing,
economic or functional obsolescence shall be given.” In 1998, LAC title 61, part
5, § 1305(G) was changed to provide that “[e]conomic obsolescence should be
recognized.” In 1999, LAC title 61, part 5, § 1305(F) and (G) were again
amended, to provide that economic or functional obsolescence “may be given,”
“may be recognized,” and “may be applied.” That permissive language remained
in the law until 2009. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. 5, § 1305.
267. ANR Pipeline Co., 73 So. 3d at 403.
268. Id. at 405 (emphasis added). The assessors have argued that they are
entitled to “great discretion” in determining whether a taxpayer has substantiated
an obsolescence request. See TBM-WC Sabine, LLC v. Sabine Par. Bd. of Rev.,
250 So. 3d 1075, 1082 (La. Ct. App. 2018). In TBM-WC Sabine, the court found
that the taxpayer in that case had not shown that the Assessor abused her “great
discretion.” Id. The court cited ANR Pipeline Co., in which for most of the years
at issue the regulations contained the permissive “may” language relating to
consideration of obsolescence. Id. (citing ANR Pipeline Co., 73 So. 3d at 403.
Moreover, nowhere in ANR Pipeline Co. does the court use the term “great
discretion.” See ANR Pipeline Co., 73 So. 3d 398. Research reveals one case in
which the Louisiana Supreme Court used the term “great discretion.” In
Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. La. Tax Comm’n, 32 So. 3d 199, 213 (La.
2010), the Court used the term in the context of the regulation relating to the
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sound analysis, and his determination is subject to review on several
levels.
IX. CONCLUSION
The most recent significant changes to the property tax arena are the
2020 Constitutional amendment allowing for an additional methodology
for the valuation of oil and gas wells and the substantial legislative
amendments related to the LTC’s review of property tax appeals and
consideration of the evidence submitted in connection with those appeals.
In fact, the LTC rules for the additional oil and gas valuation methodology
have not yet been promulgated and no matter has yet been heard before
the LTC under the new appeal review criteria. Both of these vast changes
are so new that the impact of these shifts have yet to be seen.
The changes are not over. Other revisions to the property tax statutes
and the LTC rules upsetting the balance may be forthcoming. Several
legislative instruments were introduced this 2022 Regular Legislative
Session proposing to, once again, amend the language for the
administration, review, and appeal of property tax assessments, payments
under protest, and the LTC’s rulemaking authority. Furthermore, there are
several oil and gas property tax disputes pending in district and circuit
courts on which rulings should be issued in the coming months. The
intention is to update the readers with relevant information in the next
publication of this journal.

valuation of pipeline properties, in which the regulations, at the time [2005–2006],
provided that “[e]conomic obsolescence may be recognized . . . .” Id. at 213 n.14.
In contrast, the regulation relating to valuation of wells states that “[f]unctional
and/or economic obsolescence shall be considered.” LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt.
5, § 907(A) (emphasis added).

